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Introduction 
 
As deliberative democracy enters its third generation (Elstub 2010a) research in this area is 
increasingly focused on institutionalisation (Warren 2007, 272; Dryzek 2010) leading to an 
institutional turn (Bohman 1998; Dryzek 2010). Moreover, these debates are being 
enlightened by evidence from practice as the study of deliberative democracy also takes an 
‘empirical turn’ (Dryzek 2010). Indeed there have been an increasing number of attempts in 
public administration to approximate the norms of deliberative democracy, through a 
variety of institutional structures, at various levels of governance throughout Europe, the 
USA, Australia, South East Asia, and South America, making the institutionalisation of 
deliberative democracy an issue of international importance. These debates are also central 
to considerations about democracy and governance in the UK as (Davidson and Elstub) 
clearly establish in this issue. There have been numerous attempts in the UK, with a range of 
institutional innovations, to approximate deliberative democracy like citizens’ juries (Delap 
2001), deliberative opinion polls (Luskin et al 2002), and participatory budgeting (Blakey 
2008). In addition, existing UK parliamentary institutions have been examined on their 
deliberative potential (Steiner et al 2004; Davidson and Stark 2011). These experiments are 
occurring despite the absence of a comprehensive and systematic comparison of the 
problems faced for each mechanism, co-ordinated understanding of what each mechanism 
could realistically achieve, and information about how these various mechanisms relate to 
each other. This comparative analytical gap is impeding further developments in, and 
academic understanding of, deliberatively democratic governance: ‘an extraordinary feature 
of the literature on deliberative democracy has been its unwillingness to take an 
encompassing view of democratic sites, institutions and procedures’ (Saward 2003,  166; see 
also Thompson 2008,  500).i It is likely that no one institution can achieve all of the norms of 
deliberative democracy at the same time and in the same place (see also Smith 2009, 20; 
Warren 2007, 287). Enactment of the norms of deliberative democracy will vary across key 
contexts like the different decision-making stages and levels of governance, due to varying 
features of complexity. Goodin agrees, but suggests this is normatively acceptable as long as 
all the elements of deliberative democracy are enacted within a decision-making sequence. 
However, the extent that a given sequence is acceptable ‘depends on the deliberative 
virtues coming in the right order’ (Goodin 2005, 193). Therefore, a framework for 
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comparison of institutions and their relationship to deliberative democracy is now 
imperative. 
 
To help fill this gap, this paper constructs a framework for comparing various micro 
institutions and their ability to enact deliberative democracy. The framework is the 
‘Deliberative Pragmatic Equilibrium Review’ (DePER) and its application will enable a deeper 
understanding of what different institutions can give to the institutionalisation of 
deliberative democracy. The application of the DePER comparative framework will make 
getting the ‘right’ sequence of institutions easier as it will advance empirical and normative 
understanding of what deliberative tasks can be achieved by different institutions at various 
stages of decision-making and levels of governance. Due to space limitations the DePER 
framework is outlined in this paper, but is not employed to actually compare institutions. 
The DePER framework is applicable to all political systems, but here it is explicitly tailored for 
the UK. Fig.1 below demonstrates the processes and elements of the ‘deliberative pragmatic 
equilibrium review’. Firstly, a type of micro institutional device is selected. Through a 
dialectical relationship between the available empirical evidence on the institutional device 
and normative theory, the enactment of a deliberative interpretation of four democratic 
principles is considered (inclusion, popular control, considered judgment, transparency), at 
varying levels of governance (local, regional, national, transnational, and global) and 
different stages of decision-making (agenda-setting, debate, decision-making, 
implementation and review). The process is then repeated for an alternative institution 
which allows for a comparison to be made.  
 
INSERT FIG.1 HERE 
 
The paper explains each element of the DePER framework in turn. Section one outlines the 
analytical approach at the heart of the framework, Fung’s (2007a) pragmatic equilibrium. It 
combines empirical evidence with normative theory to create a dialectical relationship 
between the institutions being compared and the theory of deliberative democracy, to 
facilitate the revision of both. Section two specifies the domains of democracy that the 
comparative approach will most fruitfully be applied to, concluding that micro deliberative 
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devices will be most suitably compared. The democratic principles that need to be enacted 
by these institutions are covered in section three. The subsequent section considers the 
transferability of these institutions across different decision-making stages and levels of 
governance. Here the DePER framework is specifically tailored to the comparison of 
institutions in the UK political system. Having laid the groundwork for the elements of the 
framework in the previous sections, the framework is then clarified and it is explained how 
through DePER analysis more appropriate sequences of institutions can be established to 
institutionalise deliberative democracy. 
 
Pragmatic Equilibrium: Combining Empirical Evidence and Normative Theory 
 
The analytical and comparative approach at the heart of the DePER framework is Fung’s 
(2007a) ‘pragmatic equilibrium’ which offers an appropriate balance between empirical 
evidence and normative theory in reviewing the institutionalisation of democracy. Ultimately 
the process of comparing institutions from a deliberative democracy perspective through 
the DePER framework is an attempt to realise the aim of Thompson (2008, 500) ‘to 
understand better the extent to which the values posited by deliberative theory can be 
realised under not only current but also potential conditions’, through the coming together 
of empirical and normative theory. This section sets out the importance of combining both, 
before outlining how pragmatic equilibrium achieves this, and can be tailored to deliberative 
democracy in the DePER framework. 
 
They key to the comparative analysis of DePER is to assess which institutions can enact the 
core values of deliberative democracy most successfully in different contexts. When 
comparing devices it is necessary to systematically review the available, and relevant, 
secondary empirical evidence, in order to map the relevant devices and their relationship to 
democratic principles. This process should be reflexive as the relationship between 
normative principles and the institutions that enact them is constantly changing. Saward 
argues that all principles and institutions contain varying ‘bundles’ of interpretations, but it 
is institutions and devices that enact these interpretations.  The institutions being compared 
should therefore be judged on their performance (Saward 2003, 164).ii Without this 
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empirical evidence we will be unaware of the conditions that the institutions can operate 
effectively in, and the tensions that exist between the democratic principles being enacted. 
Moreover, empirical evidence is also required to ensure the critical edge of deliberative 
theory is realistic and practically grounded, as it demonstrates which unfavourable features 
of current democratic practice can be changed (Thompson 2008, 500). As Goodin explains 
‘philosophers must always remember that ‘ought’ implies can. Moralising can only sensibly 
occur within the limits of what empirically can be done’ (Goodin 2005, 182; Elstub 2010c). 
Consequently, empirical evidence on deliberative democracy gives us ‘a sense of what may 
work, how, when, and why- and what may be difficult’ (Dryzek 2007, 240).  
 
Although there are many claims imbedded in the theory of deliberative democracy that can 
and must be empirically tested in practice, there are also normative claims to legitimacy that 
cannot be. The practical issues that are integral to the ability of institutional devices to enact 
deliberative democracy raise normative questions that must also be resolved. As Thompson 
(2008, 498) argues empirical research must be ‘directed toward the core problems in 
deliberative theory’. In terms of institutionalising deliberative democracy, normative theory 
is vital to the puzzle of identifying the core problems of how different institutions can enact 
different democratic principles, to which empirical evidence can provide answers (Thompson 
2008, 500). To institutionalise deliberative democracy, trade-offs will inevitably be required, 
and the answers to how trade-offs should be made between these devices and concepts 
ultimately needs to be determined by normative theory (Thompson 2008, 500, 513; Steiner 
et al 2004, 42; Habermas 2006; Chambers 2003, 320). Moreover, normative judgements are 
essential when reviewing institutions to place boundaries and limits on the number of 
relationships between institutions and deliberative principles that are seen as desirable and 
appropriate in a deliberative system. Indeed, only so much can be gained from consulting 
empirical evidence as a critical distance is required to advocate the combinations of devices 
that we should be seeking: ‘theory challenges political reality. It is not supposed to accept as 
given the reality that political science purports to describe and explain. It is intended to be 
critical, not acquiescent’ (Thompson 2009, 499; Elstub 2010c). Therefore the DePER 
comparative framework would be substantially hindered by an absence of explicitly 
normative theorising. Indeed it would be naive to presume that it is possible to study 
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democracy in a manner free of normative assumptions (Gerring and Yesnowtiz 2006; Dryzek 
2007; Thompson 2008).  
 
Fung’s (2007a) attempt to bring together normative theory and empirical evidence in 
relation to democracy is ‘pragmatic equilibrium’. Pragmatic equilibrium is based on a 
dialectical relationship between empirical evidence about the ‘consequences’ of institutional 
devices and the normative theory of democracy that prescribes these institutions. Fung 
(2007a) himself demonstrates how pragmatic equilibrium can be applied to minimal, 
aggregative, deliberative, and participatory democracy. Within the DePER framework it is 
applied to deliberative democracy. In this instance the ability of institutions to enact a 
deliberative interpretation of democratic principles at different levels of governance and 
stages of decision-making is the focus. Deliberative democracy would be in pragmatic 
equilibrium if ‘the consequences of the institutions that it prescribes realize its values well 
and better than any other feasible institutional arrangements over a wide range of problems 
and contexts’ (Fung 2007a, 445). As discussed above, because ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ the 
principles and values of deliberative democracy must be regulated by the results of the 
institutions. If deliberative democracy is not in equilibrium with its advocated institutions, 
practical reasoning on the relationship between institutions and democratic values should 
be invoked to modify the theory of deliberative democracy so that it gets closer to pragmatic 
equilibrium. However, this revision is not just applied to the interpretation of democratic 
values, but to institutions as well, and includes normative theorising (Fung 2007a, 446). 
 
Different equilibrium points will be arrived at from different models of democracy, as the 
‘consequences acceptable to one, will be rejected by the other’ due to divergence in moral 
values (Fung 2007a, 444), because deliberative democracy has different equilibrium points 
to other models of democracy. Pragmatic equilibrium must then be narrow and focus on a 
specific model of democracy, like deliberative democracy and be explicitly focused on how 
institutions specifically enact bundles of a deliberative interpretation of democratic 
concepts.  
 
Saward is critical of such ‘narrow’, model specific, and deductive approaches to institutional 
design with respect to democracy, where a ‘model’ or preferred approach to democracy is 
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set out, and institutions designed to achieve it. Saward (2003, 161) therefore encourages 
democratic theorists and practitioners to take a reflexive approach and to move away from 
thinking of contrasting democratic models, towards a more ‘ecumenical’ understanding of 
democracy that is ‘sensitive to context, open-ended, productive, and adaptable’. Smith 
(2009, 11) agrees and suggests a focus on deliberative democracy cannot answer all our 
questions; in fact, no one ‘theory can give us all the resources necessary to evaluate 
different democratic innovations’.  
 
The argument here is that because these distinct approaches to democracy do exist, and 
have these competing interpretations of democratic principles, and varying equilibrium 
points it is legitimate, indeed important, to study whether institutional devices can enact a 
specific meaning of these principles that is compatible with a particular model of democracy. 
Saward himself acknowledges that a review of how institutions can ‘strengthen particular 
interpretations’ of democratic principles is useful (Saward 2003, 165). Applying Pragmatic 
Equilibrium to deliberative democracy is then warranted. As Warren explains ‘centering 
democratic theory on deliberation as a medium of decision-making and organisation 
produces a distinctive and normatively powerful approach’ (Warren 2007, 273).  Although, 
more recently, Warren has started to sympathise with Saward’s ecumenical approach and 
urges us to think about democracy ‘as any set of arrangements that enables people to 
develop into self-developing, self-governing beings,’ when considering institutionalisation, as 
we are doing in the DePER framework, he maintains we must be specific about the 
conception of democracy being considered (Warren 2010, 11). 
 
Saward (2000) is sceptical as he questions whether deliberative democracy really is a 
distinct model of democracy given its widely accepted inability to result in consensus, and 
consequent need for voting and aggregation (Saward 2000, 67-8). Saward is certainly right 
that deliberation is not sufficient to make democratic decisions, and many other 
institutional devices are essential to promote democracy.iii Nevertheless, despite its reliance 
on voting, Chambers argues that because deliberative democracy is ‘talk-centric’ it is 
different to and has replaced voting-centric democracy as it ‘focuses on the communicative 
processes of opinion and will-formation that precede voting’ (Chambers, 2003, p. 308). 
Therefore, Thompson is justified in asserting that the role of these other institutional 
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devices should be justified from a ‘deliberative perspective’ in a deliberative democracy 
(Thompson, 2008, 513 & 515). Furthermore, as Elstub (2008, 63-5) and Thompson (2008) 
argue there are theories of democracy that are based on power and self interest and that 
see no role for deliberation like rational choice theory, social choice theory, competitive 
pluralism and elitism. Other important distinctions between deliberative and other models 
of democracy follow. Warren argues that democratic theories like direct, participatory, 
representative and pluralist democracy focus on institutions that facilitate ‘the rule of the 
people’, while classical republicanism focus on ethical goals. However, the theory of 
deliberative democracy in contrast aims to ‘advance a particular medium of political conflict 
resolution and organisation- that is communicative influence’ (Warren 2007, 273). This 
means that deliberative democracy is not ‘on the same plane of analysis’ to these other 
approaches to democracy. Deliberative democracy, therefore, requires us to judge and 
compare institutions ‘by whether they serve to enable the medium of deliberation’ (Warren 
2007, 274), but this is not the case with the other approaches to democracy.  
 
Macpherson suggests that a democratic ‘model’ should explain structural relations and have 
a distinct normative element which offers a ‘model of man’ and an ‘ethically justificatory 
theory’, and provide a critique of other models of democracy (Macpherson 1977, 2-6). 
Elstub (2008) argues that a deliberative approach to democracy fulfils these requirements of 
a democratic ‘model’ because deliberative democracy would produce differing structural 
relations to other approaches to democracy due to the privileged role afforded to public 
reason. It also has a distinctive explanatory and normative approach as it does not accept 
participants predetermined preferences as a legitimising force, even if they do need to be 
aggregated for decision-making. The deliberative model sees the formation of these 
preferences as crucial to legitimacy, resulting in competing objectives with some models e.g. 
participatory democracy and fundamental theoretical clashes with others e.g. aggregative 
models (Papadopoulos and Warin 2007, 450). In terms of the critiquing the other models, 
this critique only need to be aimed at part of the preceding model and can therefore 
embody ‘substantial elements of an earlier’ model (Macpherson 1977, 8), which accounts 
for why aggregation is still present in the deliberative approach. The different equilibrium 
points of deliberative democracy are further illustrated later in the article when we consider 
its distinct interpretation of key democratic principles. 
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Pragmatic equilibrium should also be wide by drawing on empirical evidence from a broad 
range on contexts: ‘Democratic theorists should widen their sources of inspiration and 
constraint to include the disciplined consideration of the consequences of the fullest range 
of institutional alternatives for collective decision-making and action’ (Fung 2007a, 456). In 
the DePER framework inspiration and constraint relate to the varying levels of governance, 
stages of decision-making, policy areas and range of institutional mechanisms. Therefore, 
when comparing the institutions we should consider as much relevant evidence as possible 
from these contexts. However, as the DePER framework is not a method to generate new 
empirical evidence on deliberative democracy, but rather to review existing empirical 
evidence, we are dependent on the evidence that is produced by other researchers from 
their case studies of institutions.  
 
As deliberative democracy has taken an ‘empirical turn’ (Dryzek 2010) there is now plenty of 
empirical evidence available to help us do this, but some institutional devices will inevitably 
have greater amounts of relevant empirical evidence available than others. Nor is all the 
empirical evidence on deliberative democracy equally relevant to institutionalisational 
comparison. Chambers (2003, 318) places the empirical evidence on deliberative democracy 
into three categories: ‘social, psychology, jury research, and public opinion research’, 
‘designing and running experiments especially geared to test claims of deliberative 
democratic theory’, and ‘real world cases’. As the DePER framework is an attempt to 
understand the extent institutional devices actually enact a deliberative interpretation of 
democratic principles, the latter category of evidence should be privileged in this analysis. 
As Chambers (2003, 319) explains ‘political reality is no more like a controlled experiment 
that it is like the ideal speech situation’. There will also always be limits to the amount of 
empirical evidence researchers can review. However, the more that can be considered the 
more thoroughly pragmatic equilibrium can be achieved. For all these reasons the DePER 
framework is an ongoing review, and not a process with an end point.  
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Comparing Micro Institutional Deliberative Devices 
 
Now we have established the comparative analytical framework employed in the DePER, we 
need to consider what type of institutions and devices it can compare, which will be the 
focus of this section. The specific micro institutional devices that the DePER framework can 
be used to compare, and the institutional domains they are located in, are then detailed 
below. 
 
The DePER framework is designed to compare how institutional devices enact the 
democratic principles at the various stages of decision-making and levels of governance. It 
starts from Saward’s premise that all principles and institutions contain varying ‘bundles’ of 
interpretations, but it is institutions and devices that enact these interpretations. A ‘device’ 
is defined as a ‘mechanism that plays a part in constituting a more or less formal procedure 
by which binding decisions are reached for a political community’ (Saward 2003, 167). 
Chambers (2003) is critical of this institutional trend in deliberative democracy, as she argues 
that a more comprehensive focus on political systems is required to truly achieve the 
ambitions of deliberative democracy. This point is accepted but it is still maintained that 
institutions are pivotal elements of political systems, and as Saward (2003) argues, essential 
to the enactment of democracy. As Dryzek acknowledges, ‘contemporary political systems 
do of course feature multiple interacting parts...across the layers of multilevel governance’ 
(Dryzek 2010, 7). By comparing the extent different institutional devices can enact bundles 
of democratic principles the DePER framework contributes to our understanding of the role 
institutions can, and should, play within policy sequences, and political systems as a whole. 
The DePER framework is adapted to the particular context of the UK political system in the 
next section. 
 
It is certainly the case that within a political system, deliberation should and will occur 
outside of institutions. However, the distinct nature of this ‘macro’ deliberation in 
comparison to ‘micro’ deliberation which is more likely to occur in institutions (Hendriks 
2006; Chappell 2010) suggests that an alternative comparative framework is required to 
analyse these deliberative types. Micro deliberative democracy focuses on ideal deliberative 
procedures, within small-scale structured arenas within the state, orientated to decision-
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making, with participants deliberating together in one place and at one time. Alternatively, 
macro deliberative democracy favours informal and unstructured, and spontaneous 
discursive communication that occurs across space and time, aimed at opinion formation, 
within civil society, outside and often against the formal decision-making institutions of the 
state, with partisan deliberators (Elstub 2010a). It is considered that both types of 
deliberation are required to approximate a deliberative system (Hendriks 2006; Parkinson 
2006; Elstub 2008). It is therefore essential that macro processes are not ignored in the 
study, as they also ‘frame’ and interact with micro devices. However, the principle focus of 
the DePER framework is on micro devices. Due to the unstructured and amorphous nature 
of macro processes, they are incredibly difficult to compare (Dryzek 2010, 9). Macro 
deliberation includes ‘every-day talk’ (Mansbridge 1999) which includes discussion at 
‘kitchen tables and coffee shops’ (Parkinson 2009, 7). This deliberation is incredibly difficult 
to empirically analyse and there is little existing empirical evidence here (Parkinson, 2009), 
although there are exceptions (Mutz 2006). The ‘empirical turn’ that Dryzek (2010) mentions 
has then been predominantly micro focused, and this empirical evidence needs to be subject 
to comparative analysis. The DePER framework contributes to filling this gap. 
 
Moreover, as Parkinson appreciates macro deliberative democracy provides ‘distinct 
empirical cues’ to the micro approach: ‘the macro vision directs us to examine the processes 
of public claim generation and claim making in a society, the processes of transmitting those 
claims to formal public spheres for action; and the processes of law and policy making- of 
governance- that determine precisely which claims, and which elements of claims, are 
translated into acts of governing’ (Parkinson 2009,  6). Six features of a ‘deliberative system’ 
are identified by Parkinson (2009) and include the agents who deliberate, the sites of 
deliberation, the entities that are discussed and transmitted, the method of transmission, 
the translation of entities in policy and law, and implementation of these policies and laws. 
Most of these elements are relevant to comparing micro institutions too, and are 
consequently included in the DePER framework e.g. inclusion of agents, the sites of 
deliberation, the entities, translation and implementation. However, it is transmission of 
discourses from site to site that is key to macro deliberation, but does not concern micro 
deliberation, due to the immediacy and face-to-face nature of these devices and the 
deliberation within. Therefore the context of macro deliberation is very different to the 
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micro alternative and it therefore requires a related, but different, comparative framework. 
Parkinson (2009, 14) suggests that for comparing macro deliberation, we need to compare 
societies rather than institutions, and consider ‘the degree of power concentration or 
dispersal’; ‘norms of public versus private life’; ‘media technology, political economy and 
culture’. This is clearly a vast project, one which the DePER framework could not achieve 
alone, but can contribute towards. Therefore, the DePER framework is not sufficient for a 
comprehensive understanding of how deliberation can and should operate in different 
political systems, but given the vital importance of institutions to any system, it does fulfil a 
necessary role.  
 
We still need to determine what devices to compare in the DePER framework. According to 
Fung (2007a) pragmatic equilibrium should be employed on the institutions particularly 
advocated by a model of democracy. For deliberative democracy mini-publics have 
dominated institutional debates (Goodin 2008) and have been one of the main mechanisms 
used to promote deliberative democracy in the UK (Davidson and Elstub). These types of 
institutions should then be the initial subject of DePER. However, Saward (2003) is right to 
suggest that a review must consider a range of institutions, not just those that have been 
favoured by advocates of a particular model of democracy, such as deliberative democracy. 
As Mclaverty and Halpin (2008) appreciate ‘deliberative drift’ results in a range of 
institutions being able to contribute to the enactment of deliberative democracy. DePER can 
then be applied to institutions not explicitly connected to deliberative democracy, and 
different UK parliaments and committees in Westminster and Holyrood have already been 
reviewed on their deliberative potential (Steiner 2004; Davidson and Stark, 2011) 
 
Democratic institutional devices are distinguished by a number of dimensions. The first 
dimension relates to the ‘space’ where institutions are found. Institutions can be primarily 
located in the state which invokes bureaucratic power; in the market which is organised 
through money; and in civil society which is organised through influence (Warren 2010, 4; 
Habermas 1987; Parsons 1971). Within democratic institutions located in the state we can 
further distinguish between elected and non-elected and direct and representative 
institutions (Warren 2010, 4). The second dimension to distinguish between devices is 
institutionalised and non-institutionalised (for example social movements and civil society 
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organisations) (Warren 2010, 4). Institutionalised devices can also be ‘centred’, which means 
they ‘receive input, process it, issue authoritative decisions, and then organise collective 
actions.’ Or they can be ‘devolved’ and ‘reflexive’, which means they ‘develop the conditions 
under which parties to a conflict can work out their differences and monitor solutions more 
directly’ (Warren 2010, 5). These domains and the devices that are categorised by them are 
highlighted in the table in figure.2. The devices suitable for comparison by the DePER 
framework that have micro deliberative potential are highlighted in blue. This is not meant 
to be an exhaustive list. Other institutions could be located within these institutional 
domains, and reviewed through the DePER framework. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
A Deliberative Interpretation of Democratic Principles  
 
Having now established which micro devices we are comparing, the next step is to consider 
what criteria we are comparing them on. Smith (2009) has identified a set of democratic 
principles, that we can compare the capacity of institutional devices to enact in different 
contexts: inclusiveness, popular control, considered judgement and transparency. Despite 
the focus on participatory institutions in his own study, for Smith, these principles are 
‘fundamental to any theoretical account of the democratic legitimacy of institutions’ (Smith 
2009, 12) although neither is it meant to be a definitive list of democratic goods (Smith 
2009, 20), but rather just significant ones. As set out earlier, the contention here is that this 
comparative framework needs to take an explicitly deliberative approach if we are to 
advance understanding about the institutionalisation of deliberative democracy per se. As 
Smith admits ‘democratic goods can be realised in compelling combinations that embody 
the ambitions of different theories of democracy’ (Smith 2009, 192). Smith has done such an 
analysis for participatory democracy. A related, but distinct approach is required for 
deliberative democracy (Papadopoulos and Warin, 2007). The following discussion outlines 
Smith’s interpretation of these principles, but also demonstrates how each is interpreted 
differently from a deliberative perspective, with distinct equilibrium points between theory 
and practice to other approaches to democracy. 
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Inclusiveness  
 
Inclusiveness relates to political equality of voice and presence (Smith 2009, 20-2) and 
consequently input legitimacy (Papadopoulos and Warin 2007, 453). For Saward (2003, 162) 
inclusion follows from political equality, but is more realistic than equality and still 
normatively acceptable. So to be democratic institutions must ensure inclusion through 
participatory and representative mechanisms. Inclusion has a distinct equilibrium point 
between theory and practice in deliberative democracy. For example it is more complicated 
for deliberative democrats to achieve, especially in a global era, as for deliberative 
democrats all affected should be included through participation or representation in 
decision-making. Once those who are going to contribute to the different stages of a 
decision have been determined, inclusiveness also requires that we ensure that they get to 
contribute. From a deliberative perspective there needs to be equal opportunities for all to 
express their views in a manner acceptable to others, but also for their views to be listened 
to. Other approaches to democracy do not carry this same burden and interpretation of 
inclusiveness. Deliberative democracy therefore requires distinct political obligations to 
other models of democracy (Festenstein 2002).  
 
Popular Control 
 
Popular Control requires influence in the decision-making process. For Dryzek (2007, 243) 
this is one of ‘the standard central desiderata of democracy’. Here Smith talks of control 
over output rather than determining decisions, as institutions may not actually lead to 
decisions. However, even if an institutional device does not lead to a decision, its output can 
have varying degrees of influence on decisions as the link between institutions and decision-
making is far from being an all or nothing affair, but is scalar and an issue of proximity 
(Chambers 2009). We might argue that this is the case for all conceptions of democracy, 
nonetheless, the degree of proximity of an institution to a decision affects deliberation 
itself. For example, the more proximate a decision is to deliberation the greater the 
incentive to attempt to persuade other participants with reasons (Walsh 2007; Elstub 
2010b). The need for a decision to be reached when deliberating can also make preference 
differences seem ‘less germane’ (Cohen 2007, 224), while an unproximate decision can 
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‘exacerbate divides’ (Walsh 2007, 24). Ultimately deliberative democracy is best understood 
as a decision-making mechanism: ‘Deliberation, generically understood is about weighing 
the reasons relevant to that decision with a view to making a decision on the basis of that 
weighing’ (Cohen 2007, 219). We must then assess the extent institutional devices enable 
those participating in them to determine a decision (Elstub 2010b). 
 
Considered judgement 
 
Considered judgement relates to the understanding of the technical details of the decision 
and preferences of other relevant citizens and determines throughput legitimacy. For 
deliberative democrats the best way to achieve this is through collective and public debate 
(Papadopoulos and Warin 2007, 453). This is because for deliberative democrats considered 
judgement cannot be secured privately: ‘public deliberation of free and equal citizens is the 
core of legitimate political decision-making and self-government’ (Bohman 1998). It is 
therefore crucial for deliberative democrats for preferences to be reflected upon, to be 
informed and to reflect the interests and beliefs of other citizens. The criteria for ensuring 
that judgements are ‘considered’ are then very different in a deliberative version of 
democracy in comparison to other democratic approaches. Fung (2007b) provides criteria of 
publicity, rationality and reasonableness to ‘guide the empirical examination’ of deliberation 
in institutional devices in terms of the quality of deliberation. Goodin argues that 
realistically these deliberative tasks must be distributed amongst different agents and 
devices, with each being judged on ‘different deliberative standards’, as it is too demanding 
for one device to enact all these elements together (Goodin 2005, 182). The key to 
institutionalising deliberative democracy is then to sequence these devices and actors so 
that all the components of deliberation are included in the decision-making process as a 
whole. The intention is that the DePER framework will contribute to this understanding.  
 
Transparency 
 
Transparency is the extent of openness of the decision-making process to participants and 
the public. As Saward explains (2003, 162) the democratic principles must be seen to be 
enacted. This is essential for scrutiny, accountability and trust and throughput legitimacy. 
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However, it is particularly essential to deliberative democracy, to ensure the process is 
genuinely ‘public’. This then encourages decisions to be made in the common good and 
‘public reason’ to be offered. It is then essential for transparency in a deliberative democracy 
to know not just what decision was reached, but also the reasons why that decision was 
reached (Smith 2009, 176). This aspect of transparency is not as vital to other approaches to 
democracy. 
 
Transferability of Institutional Devices in the UK 
 
The capacity of different institutional devices to enact a deliberative interpretation of these 
democratic principles is determined by many contextual factors, or what Saward (2003) 
terms ‘natural constraints’. These constraints influence the transferability of the devices to 
enact these norms in a range of contexts (Smith 2009, 26-27), which is why the sequencing 
of institutions is ultimately required, with different institutions being apt at relevant 
enactment of specific democratic principles in different contexts. Once again though, 
transferability is dependent upon the type of participation and the relevant form of 
representation, so we need an explicitly narrow focus on deliberative participation and 
representation in democratic institutions in the DePER framework. The key contexts that the 
DePER framework must take account of include features of social complexity, combinations 
of which will vary at different levels of governance, decision-making stages, and the national 
context. Here the nature of the national culture and the political system, and the extent of 
path dependency are crucial. This is why the DePER framework, although applicable to any 
national context, must be specifically tailored to specific political systems and here it is 
tailored to the UK.  
 
Features of Complexity 
 
It seems apparent then that features of complexity affect the efficiency and transferability of 
deliberative democracy in different ways to other models of democracy. We can see this 
through Femia’s (1996) analysis of the relationship between complexity and deliberative 
democracy. Complexity is associated with the ‘number and variety of elements and 
interactions’ present (Femia 1996, 360). For Femia the features of complexity that have the 
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most detrimental effect on the efficiency and transferability of deliberative democracy are 
size of area, the number, plurality and inequality of citizens, and the need for technical and 
professional expertise. These aspects are intensified by globalisation, which further 
contributes its own aspects of complexity.  
 
Diversity is currently increasing in most contemporary societies, and indeed has been for 
some time. Indeed the UK is a multicultural and diverse society and this increased pluralism 
makes enacting deliberative democracy more challenging, as attaining consensus on a 
common good becomes more difficult. Furthermore, the inclusion of all relevant views in 
public debate becomes harder to attain.. Complexity is also heightened by scale. Ensuring all 
relevant citizens meet together and deliberate together, is an empirical impossibility, and 
including all relevant representatives in in-depth debate is also logistically challenging 
(Bohman 1996, 2). There are over 60 million people in the UK, dispersed across the nation, 
making inclusion, particularly, though clearly not uniquely challenging. All societies are 
plagued by inequalities of the resources and deliberative skills that are required to 
participate effectively, and the UK is no exception. However, as deliberative democracy 
involves reasoned debate, the threshold of participation is higher than in other forms of 
decision-making, these inequalities can be further accentuated. It is important to the 
institutionalisation of deliberative democracy in the UK that these skills be distributed widely 
and reasonably equally. The relevant democratic capacities include civic capacities, such as 
civic consciousness and trust. The deliberative skills, include listening and analysing the 
assertions of others, and rationally forming and expressing one’s own preferences in light of 
available information, in a manner that will be persuasive to others. Complexity is further 
enhanced by a need for greater levels of specialism in making decisions due to the 
emergence of new problems arising through rapid social change driven by technological 
development. This dynamic has been prevalent in the UK (Stoker 2006), and has meant that 
increasingly problems require technical solutions and, therefore, decisions are thought to 
require high demands of expertise (Femia 1996, 365; Bohman 1996, 151-2). The final feature 
of complexity that Femia highlights is globalisation which has led to, and been caused by, 
increasing global competition and integration, increasing technological diversity and rapid 
change and increased dispersion of the labour market, all of which have again been 
prevalent in the UK.  This has intensified problems of scale, as it is thought that many 
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decisions now need to be made at a transnational, or even international level, and the UK is 
heavily involved in the levels of governance. Correspondingly the plurality of those affected 
by decisions, and therefore of those who should be included, either directly or indirectly, in 
decision-making has been expanded beyond the UK borders, which in turn means that 
identifying the relevant actors more challenging, and makes it more likely that there will be 
greater inequalities in relevant capacities and skills (Elstub 2007). Together, these aspects of 
complexity provide significant barriers to the enactment of the principles of deliberative 
democracy and the efficiency and transferability of institutional devices providing this 
enactment, across all political system including the UK.  
 
Levels of Governance 
 
The transferability of institutional devices is also affected by the levels of governance as the 
features of complexity vary at these different levels meaning that different institutions will 
enact different bundles of the democratic principles at different governance levels: ‘The 
future of democratic governance institutions rests on building a more complex, multilevel 
architecture for decision-making in which citizens can be engaged’ (Stoker 2006, 174). These 
levels of governance interconnected in a variety of ways and are structured by ‘framing 
devices’, such as federation and confederation which in-still a requirement for democratic 
sequencing over the multi-levels of governance e.g. local, regional/ subnational, national, 
transnational, and global. The UK is certainly a multilevel governance political system, with 
local government; devolved regional assemblies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland; a 
national legislature in Westminster; transnational membership of the European Union and 
NATO; and global membership of the G8, G20 and United Nations, to name but a few. It is 
suggested that globalization has led to the need for transnational and global institutions, 
but also increased the importance of local governance in the multilevel system (Stoker 2006, 
175; Heinelt 2010, 103-4). The features of complexity discussed above that determine the 
transferability of institutions to enact a deliberative interpretation of democratic principles 
vary across these levels of governance. With respect to the transnational and global levels of 
governance, language becomes a factor, pluralism is increased further, and the logistical 
problems of scale are intensified. As a result inclusion becomes harder to achieve in non-
territorially bound units as it is less likely that citizens will see each other as equals in 
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determining collective decisions (Heinelt 2010, 95).  There are then significant challenges to 
achieving legitimacy in such compound polities (Bader 2010), of which those applying the 
DePER framework must take account. 
 
Broadly conceived, there are two ideal types of multilevel governance. Type I systems are 
based on territorial, ethnic or cultural communities with a shared identity. Type I systems 
share characteristics such as ‘general purpose jurisdictions’, ‘a limited number of 
jurisdictional levels’, ‘non intersecting memberships’ between levels of governance, and ‘a 
system-wide durable architecture’ that promotes regionalisation and interaction (Hooghe 
and Marks 2003; see also DeBardeleben and Hurrelmann 2007). Type II systems are 
developed around particular problems amongst people who share a geographical or 
functional space that requires making of collective decisions. Here the relationships 
between levels of governance are more ‘flexible, task-specific, intersecting and variable in 
number’ (DeBardeleben and Hurrelmann 2007, 4). These two types then relate to Hirst’s 
(1994) distinction between communities of fate and choice. Type I multilevel systems are 
communities of fate, while type II systems are communities of choice: ‘Type I jurisdictions 
[at least at the level of the nation states] choose citizens, while citizens choose Type II 
jurisdictions’ (Hooghe and Marks 2003, 241). The question of which type is preferable is a 
normative question, with each having different values and benefits, meaning each type will 
vary in their suitability for enacting deliberative democracy within each type, as they will 
bring different types of complexity and different types of institution. Nevertheless, the type 
of jurisdiction does not need to be a different dimension of analysis in the DePER framework 
as ultimately Type I and II jurisdictions will co-exist in the same multilevel governance 
system to form a ‘flexible political geometry’ (Heinelt 2010, 116). Indeed both types are 
present in the UK, although both it and the EU are mainly Type I (Hooghe and Marks 2003). 
It just then needs to be a factor we are aware of when reviewing and comparing institutions. 
 
Stages of Decision-Making 
 
There are also several stages of decision-making, at each level of governance, which affect 
the transferability of the institutions in enacting bundles of democratic principles. Again 
different institutional devices will enact different combinations of the democratic principles 
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at the different decision-making stages. Saward focuses on four stages of decision-making: 
agenda-setting, debate and discussion, the moment of decision-making, and 
implementation. As Smith argues this is ‘a highly stylized’ account of decision-making, but 
does act as a ‘useful heuristic’ (Smith 2009, 23). In DePER review of the decision after it has 
been implemented needs to be added as a fifth stage. Of the decision-making process 
because deliberative democracy is not a decision-making mechanism that leads to ‘final’ 
decisions, as the process often reveals deeper problems than had been anticipated,  
preferences continue to change in light of new information arising, and change participants 
change over time. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure that all decisions remain contestable 
(Pettit 2003, 156; Niemeyer 2004, 364; Elstub 2010b).  
 
National Context 
 
National contexts can influence the manner in which institutions enact democratic principles 
as even new institutions are influenced by ‘the pre-existing institutional contexts and 
political traditions’ (Papadopoulos and Warin 2007, 448). Therefore, in applying the DePER 
framework to analyse institutions it is vital to focus on specific nations, in this case the UK, 
and to acknowledge the influence of political culture on the success of democratic 
institutions. Indeed ‘a specific type of political culture seems to be an essential precondition 
of effective democracy’ (Inglehart and Welzel 2003, 62). In this respect ‘democracy is an 
attribute of nations’ (Inglehart and Welzel 2003, 66). According Inglehart and Welzel there 
are a number of phenomena that need to be present in a culture for democracy to flourish 
which include self-expression, tolerance, trust, life satisfaction and participation (Inglehart 
and Welzel 2003). Sass and Dryzek claim that in Inglehart’s analysis of culture is therefore 
simply a ‘distribution of subjective values, attitudes, and beliefs’ and therefore lacks 
explanatory use. Although still relevant, it’s certainly not sufficient to measure deliberative 
democratic culture and ‘any failure by deliberative theory to give an account of culture 
means that the scope and depth of systematic empirical studies inspired by that theory 
remain limited’ (Sass and Dryzek 2011, 2).  For Sass and Dryzek (2011) deliberative culture, 
relates to a continuum of ‘public language’. One dimension of the continuum is who should 
be included in deliberation, and this ranges from exclusive to inclusive. The other dimension 
is ‘the symbolic structure of interactions’ and ranges from reciprocal to hierarchical.  The 
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implications of this continuum mean different political practices will have varying 
significance for people in different national contexts. These cultural variables affect the 
extent institutions operating in these cultures can generate the norms of deliberative 
democracy discussed above, and is therefore highly relevant to the DePER framework. 
However, little research has been conducted on deliberative cultures in general, including 
the UK. However, the inclusivity element of the continuum can be explored further. 
 
Dryzek categorises political systems into three broad types, based upon two types of 
dimensions: whether states are inclusive or exclusive in terms of integrating social interests 
into the policy process and whether inclusivity and exclusivity is active or passive. Inclusive 
states accept a myriad of social interests in the policy process, while exclusive states limit 
the interests that are seen as legitimate participants in the policy process. States that are 
actively inclusive, e.g. Denmark, ‘intervene in civil society to manage the pattern of interest 
organization, and also construct formal channels of participation that organize these 
interests into the state’ (Dryzek 2010, 171). If states are passively inclusive, e.g. the USA, 
channels exist for civil society to be involved in the policy process e.g. lobbying, legal action, 
consultation, political party activism, but their inclusion is not actively sought. States that 
are passively exclusive, e.g. France, only enable a few select groups to participate in the 
policy process. Actively exclusive states ‘intervene in civil society to try to undermine the 
basis for the organisation of social interests’ (Dryzek 2010, 171). These inclusivity/ 
exclusivity dimensions of a political system then significantly affect the transferability of 
institutional devices in enacting deliberative democracy, especially those devices located in 
the domains of society and non-elected institutions (see fig.2). As Dryzek’s discussion of 
mini-publics in these different types of state indicates, institutions will inevitably operate in 
different ways within these different types of political system (Dryzek 2010). The UK, during 
the 1980s under the Thatcher led government, was an example of an actively exclusive 
state, but currently is mixed; largely passively inclusive, but with tendencies to be actively 
inclusive, and with variations across the devolved regions, and the make-up of government 
(Davidson and Elstub). This indicates that the UK political system is relatively flexible, with 
the ability to change its relationship to these categorising dimensions. Moreover, given that 
the DePER framework has a highly normative element, it is still possible to consider how the 
institutions could enact the principles of deliberative democracy if the system was actively 
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inclusive, which Dryzek’s analysis suggests is the political system most conducive for the use 
of mini-publics (Dryzek 2010).  However, when applying the DePER framework in the UK the 
nature of the system as predominantly passively inclusive must still be considered, and the 
resultant role we can expect from the different institutions should be judged in this context. 
A passively inclusive political system does not prevent deliberative democracy from being 
enacted, but rather means that certain institutions will have to be sequenced in different 
ways than in other types of political system, as their enactment of democratic principles is 
affected by the nature of the political system.  
 
We must also take account of the history of the institutions, which the DePER framework 
will compare, in the particular nation (in this case the UK), as the history of these 
institutions can affect the possible future developments of these institutions. The 
phenomenon that past legacies determine the future of institutions is ‘path dependency’: ‘A 
process is path dependent if initial moves in one direction elicit further moves in that same 
direction; in other words the order in which things happen affects how they happen; the 
trajectory of change up to a point constrains the trajectory after that point’ (Kay 2005, 553). 
Path dependency makes institutional change difficult and inflexible, as it ‘suggests that the 
changes it is sensible to introduce into a political system will depend upon what has 
happened before, and that fundamental constitutional changes are rare, seismic events’ 
(Weale 2007, 17). Moreover, path dependency can affect institutions  at each level of 
governance (Gains et al 2005; Kay 2005), and is then clearly an important dimension that 
must be taken seriously, when advocating institutional reform on normative grounds, which 
is a significant element of pragmatic equilibrium, and the DePER framework as a whole.  
 
At the same time, neither is path dependency a law, institutional and policy changes still 
occur due to power, which ‘can lock a certain way of proceeding but equally it can be 
argued that at certain times, the employment of power may push for change in a certain 
direction...The institution that seemed set in concrete may not be able to defend itself from 
attack’ (Gains et al 2005, 28). Broadly institutional change can occur through ‘exogenous 
shocks’ or gradually through ‘layering’ as new elements like rules, policy processes or actors 
are are attached to them (van der Hiejden 2011). Furthermore, institutions reproduce 
themselves, and this reproduction initiates change: ‘An institution is always likely to be open 
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to change as actors explore the space created through the dynamics of reproduction and act 
strategically in order to enhance their influence’ (Gains et al 2005, 29). Indeed normative 
ideas and discourses themselves, such as deliberative democracy, can be an impetus for 
change, which ultimately means that institutional change is more agent-centred than path 
dependency theory allows for, even though historical patterns can frame the discourse and 
ideas: ‘these discursive abilities represent the logic of communication, which enables agents 
to think, speak, and act outside their institutions even as they are inside them, to deliberate 
about institutional change rules even as they use them, and to persuade one another to 
change those institutions or to maintain them’  (Schmidt 2008, 314).  Some political systems 
will suffer from path dependency more than others, and some will be more open to change 
through discourse than others (Schmidt 2008).  Evidence from the UK (Kemp 2001; Greener 
2002; Kay 2003; Gains et al 2005, 43) suggests that although path dependency is a 
constraining factor on institutional change in the UK, dynamic and corrective processes 
‘driven by value commitments and short term desires to claim credit for radical or structural 
reform’ still operate that, on occasion, push institutional changes through (Gains et al 2005, 
43). As the UK is a ‘simple’ and relatively ‘unitary’ political system, even post devolution, 
with a majoritarian and statist policy-making political system, legitimating communicative 
discourses to the public are paramount if protest, loss of public considenence and electoral 
defeat are to be avoided, and are the most likely to lead to institutional change (Schmidt 
2008).  As deliberative democracy is a theory on how to improve democratic legitimacy, 
there is then hope for those sympathetic with deliberative democracy in the UK. We 
therefore must take account of the history of an institution in the UK political system, but 
not let this prevent us from advocating normative changes to the use and practice of the 
institution.  
 
Therefore factors of national culture, inclusivity of the political system and extent of path 
dependency should feature in the DePER framework as part of the dialectical relationship 
between the empirical evidence and normative theory. 
 
Analysis in the DePER Framework 
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The DePER framework represents an overarching approach to comparing the deliberatively 
democratic potential of micro institutions rather than being a precision instrument. This is 
necessarily the case given the array of institutions that need to be compared, the diversity of 
contexts that these institutions are being reviewed in and the significantly different types of 
evidence available for each institution. Indeed a precise comparative instrument would not 
be adaptable enough. Nonetheless, as argued in this paper, some form of systematic 
framework is required if the review of these institutions is to be comparative. The DePER 
framework enables this while remaining adaptable to the vast array of contexts.  
 
The table in fig.3 then demonstrates how the relevant information can be processed and the 
institutions compared. It requires one to categorise the ability of an institutional device to 
enact a deliberative interpretation of a democratic principle at each level of governance at 
each stage of decision-making. This categorisation should be the  result of a dialectical 
relationship the empirical evidence and normative judgement. The suggested categories are 
low, low-moderate, moderate, moderate-high, high. These categories of the level of 
enactment are sufficient in number to ensure we can genuinely distinguish between the 
institutions being reviewed, while simple enough to ensure easy comparison. Exactly what 
level of enactment should be classed as ‘low’ or ‘high’ or in between is difficult to determine 
specifically here. As there is no absolute standard to judge by, it is necessarily a relative 
comparison. Specifying the ‘level’ of enactment is also difficult as the DePER comparison will 
draw on a range of quantitative and qualitative empirical data, which is not easy to combine 
and reconcile. Moreover, normative judgement is also being applied to this evidence. The 
danger is then that the comparison descends into complete relativism. However, it is the 
responsibility of whoever applies the DePER framework to justify their normative 
judgements and low to high categorisations.  
 
INSERT FIG.3 HERE 
 
Once this categorisation is complete, we can then compare institutional devices, relatively to 
each other, in relation to the level of governance and stage of decision-making they 
optimally enact each of the democratic principles. We can see how this comparative analysis 
can be conducted in the cube in fig.4 below.  
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INSERT GIG.4 HERE 
 
By enabling a deeper understanding of what democratic principles each device can optimally 
enact at various stages of decision-making and levels of governance in a political system it 
becomes possible to determine the most desirable sequence of institutions in a decision-
making process from a deliberative democracy perspective. At this stage of the analysis the 
specific features of the UK political system and their effects on institutional performance 
must again be considered to devise the most appropriate sequence for the political system 
being considered, in this case the UK. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In order to understand how political systems can move closer to approximating deliberative 
democracy, we need comparative analysis of institutional devices and their ability to enact 
bundles of democratic principles that relate to deliberative democracy, across different 
decision-making stages and levels of governance. In order to achieve this, the DePER 
framework adopts Fung’s pragmatic equilibrium as an analytical approach that focuses 
narrowly on deliberative democracy, while considering as wide as possible the relevant 
empirical evidence, which is combined with normative theory to form a dialectical 
relationship to revise both the theory of deliberative democracy and the institutions 
reviewed, until equilibrium between the two is achieved. The DePER framework necessarily 
represents an overarching approach to comparing the deliberatively democratic potential of 
micro institutions rather than being a precision instrument. However, it still enables 
systematic comparison of institutions, while remaining adaptable to the vast array of 
contexts that determine the transferability of institutions. The DePER framework can be 
tailored to any political system, but here it is adapted specifically for the UK. Application of 
the DePER framework will then result in a deeper understanding of what different 
institutions can realistically achieve in relation to enacting deliberative democracy. In turn 
this will improve our ability to sequence institutions in a manner compatible with the norms 
of deliberative democracy. 
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Notes 
                                                 
i Steiner et al (2004) have compared deliberation in parliaments, and developed the Discourse Quality Index 
(DQI) to enable them to do this. This has become an invaluable resource for comparing the quality of 
deliberation in micro institutions, such as parliaments. However, we need to compare institutions on other 
factors than purely deliberative quality to fully understand the role that they could play within a deliberative 
democracy. 
ii See also Heinelt (2010) for a contextual and reflexive approach to examining the policy process. 
iii This is why, although the DQI is an indispensable tool for comparing the quality of deliberation in 
institutions, it is not sufficient for comparing the extent institutions enact deliberative democracy per se. 
